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Social attention is one special form of attention that involves the allocation of limited
processing resources in a social context. Previous studies on social attention often
regard how attention is directed toward socially relevant stimuli such as faces and
gaze directions of other individuals. In contrast to attending-to-others, a different line
of researches has shown that self-related information such as own face and name
automatically captures attention and is preferentially processed comparing to other-
related information. These contrasting behavioral effects between attending-to-others
and attending-to-self prompt me to consider a synthetic viewpoint for understanding
social attention. I propose that social attention operates at two polarizing states: In one
extreme, individual tends to attend to the self and prioritize self-related information over
others’, and, in the other extreme, attention is allocated to other individuals to infer their
intentions and desires. Attending-to-self and attending-to-others mark the two ends of
an otherwise continuum spectrum of social attention. For a given behavioral context,
the mechanisms underlying these two polarities will interact and compete with each
other in order to determine a saliency map of social attention that guides our behaviors.
An imbalanced competition between these two behavioral and cognitive processes
will cause cognitive disorders and neurological symptoms such as autism spectrum
disorders and Williams syndrome. I have reviewed both behavioral and neural evidence
that support the notion of polarized social attention, and have suggested several testable
predictions to corroborate this integrative theory for understanding social attention.
Keywords: social attention, attending-to-others, attending-to-self, neural mechanism, autism spectrum disorders,
Williams syndrome
BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE OF POLARIZED SOCIAL ATTENTION
Humans are exceptionally social species and we constantly pay close attention to the intentions and
desires of other individuals when we interact in a social setting (Klein et al., 2009). Such behavioral
tendency of attending-to-others allows us to infer the mental states of others and therefore respond
in a context-appropriate manner. Of the socially relevant stimuli, faces and gazes are the two most
important elements. For instance, we can readily recognize people’s emotions from their facial
expressions (Atkinson and Adolphs, 2011), and we often reflexively follow other individuals’ gaze
directions to attend to the same locations or events (Driver et al., 1999; Ricciardelli et al., 2002;
Friesen and Kingstone, 2003; Tipples, 2005; for a review, see Frischen et al., 2007). Other social
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cues, like head orientation (Langton and Bruce, 1999) and
walking direction of living organisms (Blake and Shiffrar, 2007),
have also been shown to attract our attention automatically.
Attending-to-others has been the focus of a large number of
studies in the past few years (Itier and Batty, 2009; Klein
et al., 2009; Skarratt et al., 2012) and it is considered to
be a fundamental cognitive function for any social species.
Malfunctions of attending-to-others will cause significant deficits
in social interaction and social communication (Guillon et al.,
2014). One such example is patients with autism spectrum
disorders (ASD) who tend to spend less time attending to socially
salient features, such as faces and eyes of other individuals
(Sigman et al., 2006), and a failure to make use of these
information for mind-reading (Spezio et al., 2007). Opposite
to reduced attending-to-others in ASD patients, patients with
Williams syndrome (WS) often exhibit excessive attending-to-
others: they are eagerly engaged in social interaction and show
unusually high empathy for others (Järvinen et al., 2013).
In parallel to the above attending-to-others and other-
centered perspective, attending to the bodily self is also of
survival importance in our daily life. Self-related stimuli such
as one’s own name and face are arguably the most familiar
and critical information for us and, consequently, they have
processing advantages and can also capture our attention without
awareness (Humphreys and Sui, 2015). Increasing evidence has
indicated that perception and attention are biased toward self-
related stimuli. For example, face orientation discrimination is
faster and more accurate when judging your own face comparing
to others’ faces (Ma and Han, 2010; Keyes and Dlugokencka,
2014); participants are faster and more accurate in a visual search
task when the search targets are their own names relative to the
names of other individuals (Harris et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2013).
Similar self-related behavioral advantages have also been reported
for the recognition of both static and moving body parts (e.g.,
foot, hand; Frassinetti et al., 2008, 2009).
Taken together, the contrasting behavioral effects between
attending-to-others and attending-to-self seem to dispute the
simplified view that resources of attention in social contexts
are oriented merely toward others (Klein et al., 2009) or are
anchored exclusively to self-related representations (Humphreys
and Sui, 2015). Instead, attention in social contexts is a dynamic
behavioral and cognitive process that could be flexibly employed
to enhance any behaviorally salient stimuli ranging from the self
to the others, depending on specific social contexts. In other
words, social attention is not a fixed property of the cognitive
system. For each given behavioral context, the self-centered
aspect and other-centered aspect will interact and compete with
each other for the sake of deciding a saliency map of attention
in social contexts that dictates how attention resources will
be distributed among the two aspects. As such, similar to the
general attention systems (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Bisley
and Goldberg, 2010), social attention can also be flexibly oriented
according to a context-contingent saliency map. Ultimately, the
saliencymap of social attention will be integrated with the general
attention control systems to guide our perception and action
(Humphreys and Sui, 2015).
NEURAL BASIS OF POLARIZED SOCIAL
ATTENTION
Attending-to-others recruits a widely distributed neural network
that includes brain areas implicated in face and gaze perception,
i.e., fusiform gyrus (Haxby et al., 2000), posterior portion
of superior temporal sulcus (pSTS; Allison et al., 2000;
Nummenmaa and Calder, 2009), and brain areas specialized for
emotion processing, e.g., the amygdale (Adolphs and Spezio,
2006), as well as parietal-frontal areas that are dedicated to
theory of mind and social cognition, i.e., temporal-parietal
junction (TPJ; Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Decety and Jackson,
2004), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; Amodio and Frith, 2006;
Lieberman, 2007). Individuals with abnormal levels of attending-
to-others, either insufficient (ASD) or excessive (WS), often
exhibit functional and structural impairments within these neural
structures (Pelphrey et al., 2004; Amaral et al., 2008; Järvinen
et al., 2013).
On the other hand, self-reflection and attending-to-self have
been tightly linked to area mPFC (Amodio and Frith, 2006;
Lieberman, 2007). fMRI studies in healthy participants show
that area mPFC is more activated when making judgments
about self-related information relative to those of another
person, irrespective of whether the information refers to veridical
attributes such as personality traits and feelings (Jenkins and
Mitchell, 2011), or arbitrary associations (e.g., associate a square
with yourself, a triangle with strangers, and a circle with friends;
Sui et al., 2013). In the latter study, beyond enhanced responses
in mPFC, self-related stimuli also preferentially activate brain
region pSTS—an area that has previously been associated
with the functions of attending-to-others (Allison et al., 2000;
Nummenmaa and Calder, 2009).
Notably, the brain regions responsible for attending-to-
self and attending-to-others are partially overlapping, implying
that the two aspects are not unconnected cognitive processes.
Rather, it suggests that attending-to-self and attending-to-others
should be viewed as two interdependent cognitive processes that
are likely mediated via an integrative mechanism and theory.
Intriguingly, while both mPFC and pSTS show enhanced fMRI
responses to self-related stimuli (relative to other-related ones),
the general activation patters in these two areas are opposite,
i.e., the estimated beta values from general linear model analysis
of fMRI signals are positive in one area but negative in the
other (Sui et al., 2013). This means, area mPFC and area pSTS
are responding oppositely (activation vs. inhibition) in this task,
indicating that while both areas are involved in the processing
of self- vs. others- related information, their specific roles
might vary radically and contrast each other. One overarching
explanation for the contrasting role is that area pSTS is primarily
responsible for the functions of attending-to-others while area
mPFC mainly supports the functions of attending-to-self. Neural
interactions between these two areas will determine where exactly
in the saliency map lies the current state of attention for a
given social context. Remarkably, this interpretation has been
recently supported by a neuropsychological study in patients
with brain lesions to mPFC and pSTS, respectively. It shows that
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 63
Kuang Two Polarities of Social Attention
damage to mPFC leads to reduced attending-to-self comparing
to healthy controls, while pSTS impairment results in increased
attending-to-self (Sui et al., 2015).
IMPLICATIONS AND PREDICTIONS
The concept that attending-to-self and attending-to-others mark
two polarizing states of attention in social contexts unifies two
complementary lines of researches in the field. It provides a
synthetic and compelling framework for understanding social
attention, not only in healthy humans but also in clinical
populations with social attention deficits. Despite that a number
of existing behavioral and neural studies have shown results
compatible with this view, the previous studies are conducted
in isolation, i.e., examining the properties of attending-to-self
but not attending-to-others, and vice versa. Admittedly, it is not
the obligation of previous studies to consider the two aspects in
tandem, because there was no synthetic view suggesting such a
linkage. But for future studies, it will be important to take an
integrative perspective and implement task designs that will take
into account both attending-to-self and attending-to-others at
the same time. The integrative approach will likely unveil new
important phenomena and findings that could not be discerned
when considering these two aspects in isolation. In the following,
I will provide several examples of experimental paradigms and
specific predictions, which might be used to test and refine the
ideas of polarized social attention.
First, the levels of attending-to-self, measured by advantages
in the processing of self-related information (e.g., reduced
reaction time), should be negatively correlated with the levels
of attending-to-others (e.g., gaze following, time of eye-
contact). For instance, individuals with greater self-related
advantage will tend to show less frequent gaze following and
spent less time maintaining eye-contact with other people.
Second, manipulating social context should modulate the levels
of attending-to-self and attending-to-others in a predictable
way. For example, self-related advantages measured when
participants are alone will be different from when they are
surrounded by people but informed that others’ behaviors
are irrelevant to their tasks at hand. Third, behavioral
interactions between attending-to-self and attending-to-others
should be compared directly with their neural interactions in
the respective brain structures mentioned above. Furthermore,
the comparisons between behavioral and neural aspects need
to be made not only in healthy human participants but
also in patients with abnormal social attention functions.
Ultimately, our goal is that the knowledge gained from these
basic researches will be used for developing and improving
strategies for treating clinical populations with impaired social
functions.
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